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By
now, pretty much everyone knows or has at least heard
about the weakness of WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy).
WEP is the IEEE 802.11 first attempt at providing
encryption to wireless networks that was supposedly
the same as an unencrypted wired network. Based on the
well known RC4 algorithm, WEP was thought to be safe
from hackers. But unfortunately while RC4 itself is
highly regarded, the implementation contained a fatal
flaw that was eventually exploited and tools published
to accomplish it.
What
also started, were claims of how easy or how hard it
really was to crack a WEP key. On one side you had the
“gloom and doomers” saying that a WEP based
wireless network could be hacked in a matter of
minutes. On the other side you had the “nay
sayers” claiming that incredible amounts of data
had to be collected and it would take weeks of
monitoring to accomplish. Thus started the mad dash to
fix WEP, and find other ways to secure wireless
networks.
While
there are now several new technologies available to
secure WLAN’s such as WPA and 802.11i these new
tools won’t work on older devices like many DOS
based Data Collection terminals. So that brings up a
question: How secure is my D.C network if it’s still
running WEP?
Let’s
start by talking a bit about the basics of WEP and
what makes it weak. Static WEP comes in two flavors,
64bit and 128bit. When one configures a WEP key on an
access point or client device a hex (or sometimes
ASCII) string is entered to represent the key.
If we’re using 128 bit WEP, the user entered
portion is 26 HEX digits (13 ASCII Characters). If you
add up the bits, 26 hex digits is only 104 bits.
That’s 24 bits short, where’d they go? The missing
24 bits (3 bytes) are still there. You just can’t
see them. These 24 bits are called the Initialization
Vector (IV). The IV is automatically generated by the
radio and appended to the user portion of the key to
make it a full 128 bits. The IV is supposed to be
random. But it really isn’t due to the way WEP was
implemented. What ended up happening is the IV could
become predictable and with a large enough sample
could provide enough information to recover the entire
key. These predictable values were called “Weak
IV’s” and if a hacker could get enough of them,
the network could be compromised. The catch is not all
WLAN data frames contain Weak IV’s. So lots of data
is usually needed in order to get a large enough
sample.
There
are a few tools for cracking WEP keys, Airsnort,
WEPCrack and Aircrack are just a few. Most tools rely
on collecting large amounts of raw wireless data and
storing it in a data file. The data file is then fed
into a cracking program that looks for the Weak IV’s
and processes them. The amount of data needed depends
on the tool used. Some could even process raw data on
the fly as it was being monitored.
Raw
wireless frames are gathered by taking a WLAN card and
placing it in “Monitor Mode”. Normally a radio
card (or any ethernet type card) receives raw frames,
then looks to see if any are addressed to it, then
strips off all the control “stuff” and passes it
up the stack to the application. A card in Monitor
Mode, receives everything, and passes it straight on
without looking at addresses or stripping off the
control “stuff”. The control “stuff” is what
the cracking programs need to see.
Programs
like Kismet and Airodump are used to collect the raw
data. They also are used as wireless “sniffing”
systems and will reveal virtually everything about a
wireless network short of the actual data. SSIDs’s
(even if broadcast SSID is OFF), IP addressing, MAC
Addresses are all visible.
The
general rule of thumb is that at least 1,000,000 to
2,000,000 WeakIV’s are needed by Airsnort to crack a
key. Aircrack is said to need at least 500,000 to
2,000,000 Weak IV’s. The total number of packets
required to get this many Weak IV’s can be very
large. Over 15,000,000 packets may be needed. A small
network with two Access Points and 10 data Collection
terminals may take many weeks to generate that much
traffic. But a large WLAN with many laptops users
could generate that much traffic in a day or so.
The
sample network I used had 1 access point, 5 VoIP
Wireless phones and 5 Data collection terminals. Over
the course of 3 days, I was only able to collect
3,500,000 packets with a total of 200,000 Weak IV’s.
I didn’t think I had a large enough sample. I was
wrong.
I
used Airodump to collect the data and passed the
resulting file to Aircrack. The file was a little less
than 1GB. I used a 1Ghz Pentium M laptop with 256MB
RAM and XP Pro to run the test.
Aircrack
took about 3 minutes to read in the entire file. Once
it was read in, I started the cracking process. It
cracked the key in 3 SECONDS. Stunned, I ran the crack
again. This time it cracked it in 2 SECONDS! So much
for needing huge amounts of data.
Now
back to my question: How secure is my data collection
network if it’s still running WEP?
The
answer: Not very! We used to think that WEP would be
ok for small networks with low volumes. I’ve now
shown that this isn’t true. Even small networks are
vulnerable with a relatively small amount of data.
If you have a network at home with a lot of
wireless traffic, avoid WEP and use WPA with
Pre-Shared Key. Most newer consumer grade AP’s
support WPA-PSK.
What
about the Data Collection Terminals? If they’re new
enough, you may be able to replace the radios that can
support better encryption like Cisco’s LEAP with
CKIP with no performance impact to the terminal. Later
generation terminals based on Windows CE can run more
sophisticated systems like PEAP.
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